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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Lorin Blauer seeks review of a decision by the Utah Career Service
Review Board entered December 6, 2006 (Addendum at Attachment 1).
JURISDICTION
By this Petition, Petitioner seeks review of an order issued by the Utah Career
Service Review Board ("CSRB"), an administrative body created under Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19a-201. CSRB's ruling (Attachment 1) was entered despite an order issued by the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Addendum at
Attachment 2), directing that CSRB consider Petitioner's claims as raised therein;
notwithstanding that order; CSRB dismissed Petitioner's remanded claims on
jurisdictional grounds. Notwithstanding the nature of the dismissal, however, CSRB
designated the ruling as the result of a "formal adjudicative proceeding," appealable only
to this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Jurisdiction therefore obtains pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether CSRB's December 6, 2006 ruling constituted a "formal

adjudicative proceeding" under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq^ depriving Petitioner
of de novo review thereof by the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.

791475vl
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2.

Whether, despite prior orders of the Third District Court in related

litigation, CSRB erroneously declined subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims
that
a.

The DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R. 477-10-1, et seq.,

by failing to define job performance parameters;
b.

The DWS violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to

Petitioner falling outside of his job description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code
R. 477-3-2 and 3;
c.

The DWS engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation

against, Petitioner in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities, in
violation of Utah Administrative Code R. 477-15-2 and 3;
d.

The DWS representatives violated Utah Administrative Code

R. 477-2-5 by failing to maintain proper personnel records concerning Petitioner's
performance, and by refusing access to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting
negatively on his job performance, and claimed to be in his personnel file;
e.

The DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R. 477-7-7 by denying

Petitioner administrative leave; and
f.

The critical letters from DWS representatives, remaining in

Petitioner's personnel file, constituted "written reprimands," grievable to CSRB pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l).

791475vl
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CSRB's decision declines jurisdiction over the Remanded Claims, and is
reviewable for correctness - by this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), or
by the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-15. Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P. 2d 568 (Utah App.
1992).
DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8, 10,14-16
Utah Code Ann.. § 67-19a-202, 302,402 (2003)
Utah Admin. R. 477-1(31), (33), (35), (40), (56), (67), (68), (70), (71), (77), (78), (79),
(82), (85), (86), (92), and (96)
Utah Admin. R. 477-1(3), (31), (33), (34), (36), (40), (58), (69), Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19a-403 (2003)
Utah Admin. R. 477-2-6-3
Utah Admin. R. 477-2-6-7(9) and (12)
Utah Admin. R. 477-3-3-1,2, and 3
Utah Admin. R. 477-7-4(6)
Utah Admin. R. 477-7-5(1) and (2)
Utah Admin. R. 477-7-6(3) and (5)
Utah Admin. R. 477-7-7(1)
Utah Admin. R. 477-10-1 -1 and 2
791475v1
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Utah Admin. R. 477-11-1
Utah Admin. R. 477-15-2 and 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition relates to an action still pending before the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, styled: Lorin Blauer, Plaintiff, v. Utah Dept. of
Workforce Services, et al, Defendants, Civil No. 040900221 (hereafter the "2004
Action"). In the 2004 Action, Petitioner (a veteran attorney and employee of the State of
Utah) challenged, inter alia, violations of personnel rules incumbent on his employer,
Respondent Utah Department of Workforce Services ("DWS"). In administrative
proceedings before Respondent Utah Career Service Review Board ("CSRB"),
Petitioner's claims in this regard had been dismissed without hearing for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. DWS moved to dismiss the 2004 Action on the same basis, but the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County disagreed, and remanded Petitioner's
claims to CSRB for adjudication.
On December 6,2006, though, CSRB again declined jurisdiction of Petitioner's
claims of workplace rules violation, again without evidentiary hearing. Unlike the first
jurisdictional dismissal, though, CSRB labeled its December 6, 2006 ruling the product of
a "formal adjudicative proceeding".
Petitioner responded not only with this petition, but with a supplemental filing
before the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County styled: Lorin Blauer,

791475vl
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plaintiff, v. Utah Department of Workforce Services and the Career Service Review Board
of Utah, defendants (Civil No. 070900108) ("2007 Action")1. By order dated April 9,
2007, however, Judge Joseph C. Fratto of the Third District Court dismissed the 2007
Action, concluding that CSRB's December 6,2006 Order had been the result of a "formal
adjudicative proceeding".
The Third District Court has yet to take up the question whether, in dismissing the
claims remanded to it by Judge Lewis' order in the 2004 Action, CSRB disregarded that
order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
CSRB's order dismissed remanded claims from the 2004 Action without hearing,
stating that as a matter of law, Petitioner had asserted no cognizable claim. As such, this
Court should assume the truth of all factual allegations before CSRB - Russell Packard
Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 Utah 14, 108 P.3d 741; Peterson v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 2002 Ut. App. 56,42 P.3d 1253; Snowflower Homeowner's Association v.
Snowflower, Limited, 2001 Ut. App. 207, 31 P.3d 576. The Court must accept as true the
following allegations, taken from Petitioner's submittals before CSRB:
1.

Grievant began employment with the Department of Employment Security

(now DWS) in December of 1980 as a temporary, part time, employee. Effective

Petitioner filed the 2007 Action, rather than simply seeking relief in the 2004
Action, in order to meet the 30-day filing deadline imposed on challenges to final orders
of administrative agencies under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a).
791475v!

5

September 14,1981 he achieved full time merit status as a Career Service Employee with
the working title of Legal Counsel. He achieved such status specifically because of the
quality of his work and because he was willing to "go the extra mile". As Legal Counsel,
Grievant's tasks have included defending Board decisions in the Utah Court of Appeals
and the Utah Supreme Court. In addition to hundreds of cases that have resulted in
dismissals of appeals or unpublished decisions, Grievant has represented the Board in 20
cases that resulted in published decisions by the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court,
with a 75% win rate. Grievant has the highest win rate of the current DWS Legal
Counsel and more than twice the number of published decisions as other current Legal
Counsel. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
2.

When Grievant first began work for the Department, those who held

unemployment insurance hearings had the statutory title of Appeal Referee. In a bid to
gain a higher level of respect from the parties to hearings, the Appeal Referees thereafter
requested a change of title to Administrative Law Judge, which was later enacted. Letter
R. 13-16; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
3.

From June 2,1986 to December 1,1986, by special written agreement

between the Department and Grievant, Grievant served a temporary assignment, as an
Appeal Referee, now titled Administrative Law Judge-DWS, in order to gain better
understanding and insight into the role of Appeal Referee thus to be better able to fulfill
his role as counsel to the Board of Review (now Workforce Appeals Board - hereinafter

791475vl
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"Board"). His return to his regular duties was guaranteed to take place at a specific time
and at his regular pay plus any appropriate increases attached to his original job and pay
range. Letter R. 13-16; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 2.
4.

Historically, Grievant's job description detailed his overall responsibilities

and examples of probable duties. His position description questionnaire (PDQ) detailed
his specific legal duties to DWS along with the percentage of his work time that was to be
devoted to each duty. As his duties changed, so did his PDQ. For example, Grievanfs
1986 PDQ listed his duties with the Board to be 40% of his legal duties. In 1989 his PDQ
shows his Board work to be 35% of his legal duties. His 1990 PDQ lists his Board
related duties as 50% of his legal duties. His last PDQ, signed by Grievant and his then
supervisor, Virginia Smith, on April 2 & 3,1998 (Attachment 3), also lists his duties with
the Board as 50% of his legal duties. Other than for the specific period of his temporary
assignment as an Appeal Referee, none of Grievant's PDQ's included serving as, or
performing the duties of, an Administrative Law Judge-DWS as part of his duties. Letter
R. 13-16; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
5.

Historically, Grievant shared the responsibility of being counsel to the

Board with one or two other attorneys. The case load for was fairly consistent for many
years.
6.

Beginning in 1998, though, there was a significant increase in caseload —

from 342 in 1998 to 445 in 1999; to 485 in 2000; to 585 in 2001; to 819 in 2002. Petition

791475vl
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for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 10. There were 971 Board cases during
the fiscal year ended June 30,2003. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at
Attachment 11 - page 3.
7.

In Grievant's 2002 Performance Appraisal (Petition for Reconsideration,

R. 27-149, at Attachment 12) his current immediate supervisor, Ms. Downing, gave
Grievant a score of 60 points; just one (1) point less than the points needed for a "highly
successful" rating. Grievant disagreed with that appraisal. He made two pages of
typewritten comments wherein he noted specific errors in Ms. Downing's appraisal. He
noted the additional duties to which he had been assigned since 1998; but without a
change in his PDQ or a reduction of the other duties he was already performing. He also
noted the health problems that he had been experiencing. Petition for Reconsideration,
R. 27-149, at Attachment 13.
8.

Grievant's physicians have also explained Grievanfs health issues and need

for accommodation to DWS in several letters. Letter R. 5-12; Letter R. 13-16; Petition
for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachments 14-19.
9.

Grievant*s objections were ignored; however, Grievant elected not to file a

grievance in the interest of maintaining good relations with his supervisor. Petition for
Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
10.

At some point during the ramping up of responsibilities incident to

Grievanfs job responsibilities as set out above, Ms. Downing, Director of Adjudications,

791475vi
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determined to further alter Grievant's traditional duties as Legal\Enforcement Counsel III
and reassign him to a combination of Legal Counsel and Administrative Law Judge-DWS
duties. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
11.

In her performance appraisal signed June 26,2003, Ms. Downing attempted

to establish cause for an adverse employment action in order to accomplish her plan. She
tried to establish this "cause" through an "unsuccessful" performance rating. Petition for
Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 20.
12.

In her 2003 Performance Appraisal, Ms. Downing dropped Grievant's 2002

score 21 points from 60 to 39 points, from just one point below "highly successful" down
to just two (2) points less than the points needed for a "successful" rating; she offered no
objective, measurable evidence to support that precipitous drop, though. Instead, she
claimed reliance on unsubstantiated information and allegations kept from Grievant.
Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
13.

On July 16, 2003 Grievant filed a five page response/grievance, wherein he

noted numerous errors Ms. Downing made in her performance appraisal. Petition for
Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 11.
14.

In an e-mail dated July 25,2003, Ms. Downing acknowledged some of the

errors she had made in her performance evaluation - particularly in regards to ratings on
factors and criteria supportable by objective evidence - but refused to give Grievant the
two additional points needed for a "successful" performance evaluation. Her reason was

791475vl
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her undocumented allegation that he was "not carrying his fair share of the workload."
Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 21.
15.

Ms. Downing did not deny, or even respond to, most of the information

Grievant provided in his response, including his information in the last paragraph of page
two of his response that his case load for the Board had increased from 222 to 443 cases
during that year. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 21.
16.

Grievant had also noted that his Board work was 50% of his workload on

his most recent PDQ (April 2, 1998) at which time his Board case load was 171 cases and
now it was over 2lA that number. Ms. Downing refused to supply any evidence that
Grievant was not carrying his fair share of the work load. Petition for Reconsideration,
R. 27-149, at Attachments 11 and 21.
17.

On July 28,2003 Grievant appealed Ms. Downing's unsuccessful

performance rating to Executive Director Ms. Ireland. The primary basis for his appeal
was that the rating was invalid because it was not based on a proper job or position
description, proper and adequate performance plan(s), adequate, accurate, objective, or
otherwise appropriate performance standards and criteria, or a proper or accurate
interpretation of relevant facts and history. Grievant also argued that just correcting the
errors Ms. Downing acknowledged in her July 25,2003 response to his grievance should
have been sufficient to give him the additional two points he needed to move from an
unsuccessful to a successful rating. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.

791475vl
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18.

In August 20,2003, Grievant and his representative met with Ms. Downing

and Joanne Campbell to discuss his performance management. Letter R. 5-12; Letter R.
13-16; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
19.

Grievant pointed out that there was no performance plan in place upon

which Ms. Downing could base an objective evaluation. He referred to the PDQ from
which the performance plan should be derived and asked what criteria she used to
evaluate Grievant's performance. Letter R. 5-12; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
20.

Except for identifying alleged negative comments of unidentified

employees never shared with Grievant, Ms. Downing would not reveal any specific
elements, criteria, or evidence of failure. She simply reiterated that Grievant's work was
not timely nor was he carrying his fair share of the load. Letter R. 13-16; Petition for
Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
21.

Ms. Downing again implied that Grievant did not do "quality work," and

made other vague observations as to others not wanting to work with him; however, when
challenged, she did not produce any objective evidence to back up her statements. Letter
R. 5-12; Letter R. 13-16; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
22.

In response to the question what a "fair share of the workload" was,

Ms. Downing said it was "difficult to quantify," and then actually asked Grievant what he
thought others were doing. Grievant told her that he was not privy to that information.
Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
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23.

Immediately after the meeting, Ms. Downing (through Joanne Campbell)

suggested that Grievant should be an Administrative Law Judge-DWS because that
position was easier to quantify and qualify but that they would leave his salary range and
title unchanged. Grievant responded that this was not an appropriate solution. Letter R.
5-12; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
24.

In the past, Ms. Downing had frequently mentioned to Grievant that she did

not fully understand Grievant's job, so Grievant offered to analyze the position and come
up with some recommendations for not only some alternative combinations of duties, but
also a performance plan with specific elements and criteria for rating the successful
performance of those elements. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
25.

Ms. Downing voiced no objection to this plan; accordingly, Grievant

offered in writing suggestions for two possible combinations of assignments that would
accommodate his disabilities and meet the needs of the Department. Petition for
Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
26.

Grievant offered to further negotiate until he and they could come up with a

solution that would fulfill the needs and interests of all concerned. Ms. Downing, though,
rejected the offer and closed negotiations. Letter R. 5-12; Letter R. 13-16; Petition for
Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachments 22 and 23.
27.

In a letter dated September 5,2003, Ms. Ireland, granted Grievant's appeal

and awarded him a successful performance rating, thereby invalidating the cause for
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Ms. Downing's intended adverse action. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at
Attachment 24.
28.

Prior to the overturn of the unsuccessful performance rating, and during a

Performance appraisal interview, Grievant again gave Ms. Downing notice of his health
problems that should be accommodated. She refused to look at his information and said it
was too late to be considered in his performance appraisal. Letter R. 5-12; Petition for
Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
29.

Ms. Downing did instruct Grievant that he had to ask for a determination of

his ADA qualification; then she requested of Chuck Butler, DWS ADA Coordinator, a
review of Grievant's need, and qualification, for ADA accommodation. Petition for
Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
30.

Mr. Butler made disbelieving and sarcastic remarks relative to Grievant's

disabilities - particularly his sciatic nerve disorder. He questioned the authenticity of the
Doctor's recommendations. He called Grievant's Doctor and made offensive remarks
implying that the Doctor's recommendations were not genuine or valid. He declared that
Grievant was not qualified for accommodation under ADA. Petition for Reconsideration,
R. 27-149.
31.

Nevertheless, Mr. Butler finally recommended that Ms. Downing consider

his disabilities in making assignments. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
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32.

Ms. Downing had been told by Grievant that he could perform his duties as

Legal\Enforcement Counsel III to the Workforce Appeals Board with minimal,
inexpensive accommodation to his physical health issues, but could not do the duties of
Administrative Law Judge-DWS to the extent assigned without damage to his health - not
even with the more extensive and expensive physical accommodations discussed. Letter
R. 5-12; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
33.

During the years of his employment, Grievant carefully managed his sick

leave account accruing 857 hours of Sick leave as of September 26,2003, with the intent
of buying paid up health insurance upon retirement. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27149.
34.

Even though Ms. Downing could not impose the previously planned action

as a "corrective action," and even though she was fully informed of the physical
impossibility of Grievant performing the functions of an Administrative Law
Judge-DWS, she nevertheless carried out her "corrective action" demotion by referring to
it as a "change of assignment". In a letter dated September 9, she removed from Grievant
all of his historical duties as LegalVEnforcement Counsel III and assigned him full time
and exclusively to the lesser duties of Administrative Law Judge- DWS, a position
distinctly different from his current position of Legal\Enforcement Counsel III. Letter R.
5-12; Letter R. 13-16; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 25.
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35.

Given the information then at her disposal, Ms. Downing acted with full

knowledge that Grievant could not physically perform the duties as assigned without
injury. Letter R. 5-12; Letter R. 13-16; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
36.

This was not a temporary assignment. Ms. Downing clearly stated that

Grievant would no longer perform his duties as LegalVEnforcement Counsel III, including
being Legal Counsel to the Workforce Appeals Board, and would henceforth only
perform the duties of Administrative Law Judge-DWS. Petition for Reconsideration,
R. 27-149, at Attachment 25, page 1, paragraph 1.
37.

Ms. Downing listed numerous alleged events and representations as giving

specific "cause" for her action. None of them, though, has been documented in any way
in Grievant's personnel file, nor have they been presented to Grievant for rebuttal; neither
has he been granted a meaningful hearing on any of them. Petition for Reconsideration,
R. 27-149.
38.

Ms. Downing's action was instituted without warning to Grievant or

opportunity for him to be heard by the Department Head. Petition for Reconsideration,
R. 27-149.
39.

Grievant appealed Ms. Downing's action to demote to Ms. Ireland. Petition

for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
40.

In a letter dated October 14, 2003, Ms. Ireland upheld Ms. Downing's

action. Letter R. 5-12; Petition for Reconsideration, R, 27-149, at Attachment 26.
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41.

Grievant again notified DWS that he could not perform the functions of an

Administrative Law Judge-DWS but could do the work of Legal Counsel, especially
counsel to the Board. He notified that he could do much of that work from his home as
he had done in the past. Ms. Ireland essentially ignored his offer to work and made
disparaging and sarcastic remarks about Grievant's need for sick leave. Letter R. 5-12;
Letter R. 13-16; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 27.
42.

Because Grievant could not safely perform the new combination of duties,

he requested administrative leave until the problems could be resolved. Letter R. 1;
Letter R. 18-19; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
43.

Ms. Ireland suggested that she did not believe that she could allow

Administrative leave, but would check into it. Later she refused his request, insisting that
he go on extended FMLA sick leave despite his offer to do Board work. Letters R. 1,1819; Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at Attachment 27.
44.

In his October 15,2003 letter, placing Grievant on FMLA leave, DWS

Human Resources Director, Kevin Beutler requested that additional medical information
be submitted to him by November 14,2003, to justify Grievant's continuing on FMLA
medical leave. Grievant's Doctor supplied a letter stating that Grievant did not need to be
on medical leave; that he was fit - and always had been fit - to continue his regular duties
as Legal\Enforcement Counsel III. He stated he had recommended that Grievant "be
placed on FMLA sick leave, not because he couldn't work, but to protect his health
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because the letters from the Department revealed that they were forcing him to perform a
combination of duties that [the doctor] specifically advised against under conditions that
were unnecessarily stressful." He concluded that "Grievant should return to work only
when these issues are appropriately addressed . . . [and] [t]hat seems to be in the control
of the Department, not Grievant." Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149, at
Attachment 28.
45.

On or about November 13,2003, Grievanfs representative delivered the

Doctor's letter to Mr. Beutler. Mr. Beutler then stated to the representative that Grievant
was a "slacker"; that there were "affidavits in his file" including "signed statements and
notarized statements" to the effect that Grievant was "lazy"; that he "did the minimum he
could get away with"; that he had been caught "asleep in his office with his head on his
desk"; that "no one wanted to work with him"; and that "everyone wanted to work around
him but not through him". Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
46.

Upon hearing the request that those statements and affidavits be produced

for review and rebuttal, Mr. Beutler said that they would not let Grievant examine
evidence and would continue to refuse to allow it. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27149.
47.

On November 21, 2003, Grievant and his Representative went to the DWS

personnel office to view Grievant's personnel file. They were told by staff that there was
no paper file; only a computer file of microfilmed documents. There were no affidavits
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or notarized statements in Grievant's computerized personnel file of the kind Mr. Beutler
had identified. Ms. Downing's unsuccessful 2003 performance appraisal was still in the
computerized file. Ms. Ireland's September 5,2003 letter overturning Ms. Downing and
granting Grievant a successful performance appraisal was not in the file. Other
significant documents were missing. Petition for Reconsideration, R. 27-149.
48.

Plaintiff filed the 2004 Action on January 7, 2004. In his Complaint,

Plaintiff claimed that DWS improperly took corrective action against him. R. 565-575.
49.

Before filing the 2004 Action, Plaintiff sought relief before CSRB; CSRB,

however, conducted a preliminary jurisdictional review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 6719a-403(2)(a), and determined that it had jurisdiction over none of Plaintiff s claims
herein. R.
50.

By his First Claim for Relief in the 2004 Action, therefore, Plaintiff sought

trial de novo of all issues raised before CSRB, as to which it had declined jurisdiction.
R. 565-575.
51.

The parties to the 2004 Action thereafter filed cross dispositive motions.

By Memorandum Decision dated August 16, 2004 in the 2004 Action, the trial Court
dismissed certain of Plaintiff s claims therein. All other issues asserted in the 2004
Action, however, were preserved by the Third District Court as follows:
Given the Court's decisions above, it appears that the only remaining issue
is the CSRB's refusal to consider the Plaintiffs remaining grievances based
upon alleged violations of the personnel rules. The Court concludes that
Plaintiff, in his Request for Reconsideration before the CSRB, preserve all
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of his remaining allegations concerning the Defendant's violations of the
Personnel Management Act
However, rather than determining
whether the violations actually occurred, it appearsfromthe dialogue with
Plaintiffs counsel during oral argument, that he would prefer to have these
matters transferred back to the CSRB for consideration. Accordingly, to the
extent that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment seeks a renewed
opportunity to have the CSRB consider his grievance related to the alleged
violations of the personnel management act, the Court grants the same and
remands the matter back to the CSRB.
Memorandum Decision in the 2004 Action, R. 576-581, at pp. 3-4.
52.

The Court's ruling in its Memorandum Decision in the 2004 Action

(R. 576-581) was reflected in its Order of December 8, 2004 (R. 582-590, Addendum at
Attachment 2), in which the Court remanded the following issues back to CSRB for
further determination ("Remanded Claims"):
a.

The DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R. 477-10-1, et seq.,

by failing to define job performance parameters;
b.

The DWS violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to Plaintiff

falling outside of his job description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code
R. 477-3-2 and 3;
c.

The DWS engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation

against, Plaintiff in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities,
in violation of Utah Administrative Code R. 477-15-2 and 3;
d.

The DWS representatives violated Utah Administrative Code

R. 477-2-5 by failing to maintain proper personnel records concerning Plaintiffs
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performance, and by refusing access to alleged documentation supposedly
reflecting negatively on his job performance, and claimed to be in his personnel
file;
e.

The DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R. 477-7-7 by denying

Plaintiff administrative leave; and
f.

The critical lettersfromDWS representatives, remaining in

Plaintiffs personnel file, constituted "written reprimands," grievable to CSRB
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l).
53.

Following affirmation of the Court's Order in the 2004 Action by this

Court, Plaintiff requested a hearing on the Remanded Claims before the CSRB. DWS
then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Remanded Claims, placed before CSRB by Order of
this Court in the 2004 Action, again on jurisdictional grounds. R. 465-632.
54.

When DWS' Motion to CSRB to dismiss the Remanded Claims was placed

before the trial Court in the 2004 Action, in further support of Plaintiff s Motion to
Reconsider Remand therein, the Court deferred ruling on the Motion, and indicated an
intent to await CSRB's disposition of the Motion to Dismiss the Remanded Claims. In
her ruling, Judge Lewis stated the following:
. . . [T]he defendant's recent filing of a Motion to Dismiss before the CSRB
puts an entirely new complexion on the plaintiffs pending Motion to
Reconsider. Specifically, the defendants Motion essentially argues that the
CSRB does not have jurisdiction and ought not to consider the claims
previously remanded to it by this Court. Given this Court's prior rulings,
the purpose of this Motion remains unclear.
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The Court will await a decision by the CSRB on the defendant's Motion to
Dismiss before reaching a definitive decision on the plaintiffs Motion to
Reconsider.... The Court will defer ruling on the Motion to Reconsider
until it hears from counsel.
See Addendum at Attachment 3.
55.

By Decision dated December 6,2006 (Addendum at Attachment 1), CSRB

dismissed the Remanded Claims, holding - despite the Third District Court's Order in the
2004 Action - that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Remanded Claims. R. 659-673.
56.

Despite basing its decision on jurisdictional grounds (precisely as it had

done prior to Plaintiffs filing of the 2004 Action), CSRB claimed to have afforded
Plaintiff a "formal adjudicative proceeding" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-8, and notified him that his sole remedy was a petition for review of the record by the
Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. R. 659-670.
57.

Upon receipt of CSRB's Decision (R. 659-670), Plaintiff renewed his

Motion to Reconsider Order of Remand in the 2004 Action (as contemplated in Judge
Lewis' October 30, 2006 ruling (R. 674-676); as of this filing, however, no ruling has
issued thereon in the 2004 Action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Neither DWS nor CSRB should have been permitted to place this matter in such a
posture that it appears before this Court at all. The claims remanded by the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah in the 2004 action were to have been
heard by CSRB; its determination that it lacked jurisdiction to hear those claims had
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already been overturned. By simply repeating its disagreement with the Third District
Court in the 2004 action, and labeling its decision as a result of a "formal adjudicative
proceeding", however, CSRB has managed to avoid enforcement, by the Third District
Court, of its own order in the 2004 action. Courts of general jurisdiction in the State of
Utah retain inherent jurisdiction to enforce their own orders. On this basis alone, this
matter should be remanded to the Third District Court for consolidation into the 2004
action.
In addition, Petitioner was afforded no more a "formal adjudicative proceeding" in
the second jurisdictional hearing before CSRB than it received in the first such hearing.
Without considering any additional evidence, without reviewing any additional
documentation, without hearing a single word of testimony from Petitioner or any other
witness, CSRB again dismissed the remanded claims on subject matter jurisdiction
grounds. This procedure was a "jurisdictional review" under Utah Admin. R. 477-1(3),
(31), (33), (34), (36), (40), (58), (69), Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403, not a "formal
adjudicative proceeding" affording Petitioner due process and warranting an appeal
directly to this Court. A full de novo review was warranted by the Third District Court.
Setting aside procedural improprieties, CSRB improperly declined jurisdiction
over each of the remanded claims. On the face of the record before, CSRB had clear
evidence that DWS had violated Utah Administrative Code R. 477-10-1, et seq.9 by
failing to define his job parameters. Similarly, evidence on the face of CSRB's record
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demonstrated that DWS had violated personal rules by assigning Petitioner
responsibilities falling outside of his job description in violation of Utah Administrative
Code R. 477-3-2 and 3. Ample evidence before CSRB established that DWS had
engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against, Petitioner in connection with
his requests for disability accommodations in violation of Utah Administrative Code
R. 477-15-2 and 3; CSRB's observation that such claims would also support the claim for
discrimination under state or federal anti-discrimination law does not render them any
less a violation of "personnel rules", falling squarely within its jurisdiction and mandating
adjudication. Evidence before CSRB warranted hearing on Petitioner's claim that DWS
representatives had violated Utah Administrative Code R. 477-2-5 by failing to maintain
proper personnel records concerning his performance, and by refusing him access to such
documentation. CSRB should have considered whether DWS abused its discretion in
denying Petitioner administrative leave under Utah Administrative Code R. 477-7-7.
Finally, Petitioner was entitled to hearing concerning DWS's failure to remove "written
reprimands" from his personnel file.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE TRIED DE NOVO
BEFORE THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

As a threshold issue, this matter should have been retained by the Third Judicial
District Court, and not placed before this Court at all. CSRB disregarded entirely a
standing order of the Third Judicial District Court remanding the Remanded Claims for
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disposition, dismissing Petitioner's claims again on jurisdictional grounds, again without
hearing on their merits. CSRB's ruling was erroneous on two grounds.
A.

The Third District Court Should Retain Jurisdiction Over
Plaintiffs Claims by Virtue of its Rulings and Orders in the 2004
Action

Both DWS and CSRB make the assumption that, by creatively labeling CSRB's
disregard of this Court's Order in the 2004 action as a "formal adjudicative proceeding,"
CSRB could sidestep the Third District Court's orders in the 2004 Action, taking that
Court "out of the loop" and forcing Petitioner before a new Court for limited review.
Their argument in this regard, though, ignores a fundamental tenet of statutory and
common law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(2) confers upon the district courts of the State of Utah
power to issue orders and writs "necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments,
and decrees". This provision is a recognition of a long-standing tenet of common law:
That all courts retain inherent jurisdiction to enforce their own orders. This principle was
recognized in the case of JJWv. State of Utah, 2001 Ut. App. 271, 33 P.3d 59; see also,
Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 116 S. Ct. 862, 133 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1996); Phone
Directories Company, Inc. v. Clark, 2006 WL 3735500 (10th Cir. 2006); Demorizi v.
Demorizi, 28 Fla. Law Weekly D1747, 851 So. 2d 243 (Dist. Fla., 3 rd Dist. 2003); In Re
Marriage ofHartman, 305 111. App. 3d, 338, 712 N.E.2d 367 (Ct. App. 111. 2nd Dist.
1999).
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The Third District Court remanded to CSRB issues presented to it on crossmotions for summary judgment, with the express directive that they be heard on their
merits. In so ruling, the lower Court expressly rejected the notion that CSRB lacked
jurisdiction to hear those claims - as CSRB had decided prior to the filing of the 2004
action. Upon remand, CSRB flatly disregarded the Court's order, finding once again that
it lacked jurisdiction over the very claims which it had been directed to hear and resolve
on their merits.
It was for this reason that Petitioner (in addition to filing this Petition) renewed his
motion to the Court in the 2004 action, seeking that the Court reconsider its Order of
Remand, and grant trial de novo on the remanded claims; the sole reason for this Petition
being filed is the fact that the Court in the 2004 action has yet to rule on that motion. If
this Court buys into the argument that this Petition is properly before it because CSRB
afforded Petitioner a "formal adjudicative proceeding", it perpetuates the very conundrum
for which Defendants in this action are hoping, and which they have successfully created
in this case all along: multiple proceedings at cross purposes, none of them reaching the
merits of Plaintiff s claims. It is submitted that this case should be consolidated with the
2004 case, the Motion to Reconsider and Consolidate the remanded claims in that case
granted, and this matter heard on its merits before the Third District Court.
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B.

The Second Motion to Dismiss Before CSRB Was No More a
"Formal Adjudicative Proceeding" Than Was the First

CSRB and DWS invoked administrative regulations for the proposition that, while
CSRB's first rejection ofjurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims was an "informal
adjudicative proceeding," the second rejection was a "formal adjudicative proceeding"
because a hearing officer heard oral argument. The distinction, however, ignores the
definition set up by the Utah Legislature.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-8, a "formal adjudicative proceeding" must
afford a petitioner certain rights and opportunities:
Except as provided in subsection 63-46B-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a)
The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties
reasonable opportunity to present their positions . . .
(d)
The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
By its express terms, CSRB's Order of Dismissal was based purely on documentation
already before it incident to its prior dismissal of Plaintiffs grievances, which was
overturned by Judge Lewis in the 2004 action.
In related proceedings, DWS has cited the case of Lopez v. Career Service Review
Bd, 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992) for the proposition that a jurisdictional hearing is
always a "formal adjudicative proceeding" if CSRB so designates it. Lopez, however,
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holds just the opposite. In that action, the Respondent agency submitted a full
"chronology" of events and documents, which the Petitioner in that case agreed to accept
as its case. For his part, the Petitioner presented evidence from the stand for
approximately three hours. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under these
circumstances, the Petitioner had received all procedural rights indicated under § 6346(b)-8 as prerequisite to a "formal adjudicative proceeding". Plaintiff in this action, by
contrast, received no such consideration - he has now been thrown out from the CSRB
twice (despite Judge Lewis' order in the 2004 action) without ever being able to present
evidence, question witnesses, present rebuttal, etc. No less than the CSRB ruling giving
rise to the 2004 action, the order forming the basis of this action was not a "formal
adjudicative proceeding", under any possible reading of the governing statute. As such,
Plaintiff is entitled to his "day in court" before the Third District Court.
Concerning CSRB's own label for its order, it is meaningless. In the case of
Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), the Court concluded that: "the
administrative review of petitioner's grievance file, without a hearing, is properly
characterized as an informal adjudicative proceeding under the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-5 . . . and . . . that Rule 140-1-17(B) of the
Career Services Review Board designating all adjudicative proceedings before the Career
Services Review Board as formal adjudicative proceedings does not apply, and could not
properly apply, to the summary dismissal of the grievance by the administrator upon a
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review of Petitioner's file and in the absence of the hearing." 800 P.2d at 825.
Alumbaugh stands for the proposition that, however labeled, a proceeding before CSRB
which does not afford the Petitioner an evidentiary hearing is not a "formal adjudicative
proceeding", and neither the hearing officer's statement to the contrary, nor the wording
of an administrative rule, can change that. A "formal adjudicative proceeding", in short,
was precisely what this Court, in the 2004 action, remanded this matter to the CSRB to
conduct. Instead, CSRB conducted a non-evidentiary hearing "the sole purpose [of
which] . . . was to more fully consider the Agency's Motion to Dismiss". In the wake of
that proceeding, and with no further proceedings, CSRB took precisely the same position
which it had taken in response to Plaintiffs first petition, before the 2004 action was
filed: It had no jurisdiction over the Remanded Claims. This decision was reached
without any evidence, without any cross-examination, without any right of confrontation
of witnesses - without any rights or opportunities granted to Plaintiff that had not been
granted the first time, other than the opportunity to argue his position verbally as well as
in writing.
It was clearly concern over the prospect of CSRB acting in precisely this fashion
which caused Judge Leslie Lewis, in her ruling of October 30, 2006 in the 2004 action
(Exhibit 5 hereto), to reserve judgment on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider her order of
remand until she saw what CSRB would do with DWS's Motion to Dismiss. CSRB has
clearly acted precisely as Judge Lewis feared. For this Court to condone CSRB's
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unilateral classification of its conduct as a "formal adjudicative proceeding",
unaccompanied by any of the statutorily-mandated attributes of such a proceeding, is
clearly not warranted by law.
POINT II.

CSRB IMPROPERLY DECLINED JURISDICTION
OVER THE REMANDED CLAIMS

Even setting aside its disregard of Judge Lewis' rulings in the 2004 action,
CSRB's refusal to afford a hearing on the remanded claims was no more proper than the
first jurisdictional refusal reversed by Judge Lewis. Each of the six remanded claims will
be addressed in turn.
A.

DWS Violated Utah Administrative Code R. 477-10-1, et seq., by
Failing to Define Petitioner's Job Parameters

CSRB declined jurisdiction to consider whether DWS had failed to define
Petitioner's performance standards and expectations in compliance with DHRM 47710-1, observing that Petitioner had previously raised the inadequacy of his job description
incident to his July 16,2003 Response to Performance Appraisal/Grievance, filed in
response to the unsuccessful performance rating received from Supervisor Tani Downing
(R. 528-533). Since that grievance was ultimately resolved in Petitioner's favor, and
since he therefore did not pursue it further, CSRB reasoned, it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the matter as part of Petitioner's later grievance when - clearly in retaliation
against him for having successfully grieved her unsuccessful performance rating - Tani
Downing took "corrective action" against him. In proceedings before CSRB, DWS held
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up the July 18,2003 "Performance Plan/Evaluation" (R. 534-546), arguing that the matter
was therefore moot.
Utah Administrative Code R. 477-10-1, et seq.9 governs career service employee
evaluation procedures incumbent upon state agencies including DWS. Thereunder,
performance standards and expectations for each employee must be specifically written in
a performance plan by August 30 of each fiscal year. Supervisors are to provide
employees with regular verbal and written feedback based upon the standards of
performance and conduct outlined in the performance plan. Management must adopt a
rating system by August 30 of each fiscal year, to be effective for the entire year.
Contrast the standard imposed by R. 477-10-1 against the vague guidelines
imposed upon Petitioner by Ms. Downing in conjunction with his 2003 job performance
review (and again following the "reassignment" which followed, reversal of the
performance review notwithstanding) - R. 505-522; 534-546. By CSRB's own
admission, these are the "performance plans" upon which it relied in dismissing
Petitioner's claims. The Court will search in vain for any qualifying elements of a
"performance plan" under R. 477-10-1 against which Petitioner could objectively
measure his job performance during the time period in question. Agency expectations
concerning Petitioner's job performance had long since parted company with any written
job description applicable to his position. Workload had increased dramatically.
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Additional responsibilities were being woven in by DWS without input or authority from
DHRM.
Then, in the face of these unwarranted and undefined changes in job
responsibilities, Petitioner was notified that he was not doing his fair share of the work even though his own supervisor was unable to articulate the nature of the work, or the
amount thereof constituting Petitioner's fair share, and even though the resulting
unfavorable performance review was overturned (yet mysteriously left largely unaltered
in the personnel file).
It is the nature of career service employment that the employee is given an
objective, measurable standard against which to compare his job performance. DWS, to
be blunt, has thrown the requirements of R. 477-10-1 to the winds, and CSRB has
sanctioned its actions. Any employment action concerning Petitioner's position taken by
DWS in such an administrative vacuum, constitutes a perse violation of the rule.
The 2003 "Performance Plan/Evaluation" (R. 534-546) was no more adequate to
satisfy the requirements of R. 477-10-1 than was the December 29,2000 "Performance
Plan/Evaluation" (R. 505-522). Petitioner is entitled to a determination whether, on its
face, the Performance Plan/Evaluation offered by DWS is adequate to satisfy the
regulatory requirement. CSRB's claim that it lacks jurisdiction to make this
determination was manifest error.

791475vl

31

B.

DWS Violated Personnel Rules by Assigning Job Tasks to
Petitioner Falling Outside of His Job Description, in Violation of
Utah Administrative Code R. 477-3-2 and 3

From Petitioner's last genuine "performance plan" to the time of his 2003
performance evaluation, there were numerous intervening changes in his job assignments
and responsibilities - all without supporting authority from DHRM. It was on these job
modifications, together with the drastic increase in workload, that Ms. Downing
apparently relied in her personnel decisions concerning Petitioner. Ms. Downing's
modification of Petitioner's job responsibilities in this manner must fall outside the
broadest interpretation of Utah Administrative Code R. 477-3-3 concerning discretion to
modify job responsibilities - it made no sense to saddle Petitioner with additional
responsibilities when the workload for DWS's legal counsel was so overwhelming.
Considering that Ms. Downing's main complaint against Petitioner was that he was not
carrying his "fair share," the imposition of additional responsibility seems particularly
egregious.
CSRB counters all the foregoing by observing that, in its decision in Blauer v.
Department of Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204 (Utah App. 905), this Court held that
Petitioner's "reassignment" to the holding of administrative hearings full-time did not
constitute a "demotion." From this, CSRB reasoned that it also did not constitute an
assignment to task falling outside of Petitioner's job description. In this, CSRB engaged
herein an unwarranted leap of logic - the issue of whether Petitioner was improperly
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"demoted" is separate and apart from whether he had been "reassigned" in violation of his
job description.
Simply put, Petitioner's reassignment to do unemployment hearings full-time fell
afoul of his only standing job description, which contemplated "special assignments" on a
limited basis. To permit "special assignments" to consume the entirety of his time
(particularly when he was physically and psychologically unable to assume such
responsibilities - see below) constitutes far more than a mere "modification" of his duties.
In this regard, Petitioner certainly acknowledges the content of R. 477-3-3,
providing that "management may assign, modify or remove any employee task or
responsibility in order to accomplish reorganization, improve business practices or
process, or for any other reason deemed appropriate by the department administration."
To permit application of this rule to transform a Legal/Enforcement Counsel III to a fulltime Administrative Law Judge - a separate and distinct job classification under the
DHRM system - would be to permit the exception to swallow the rule. It is submitted
that the holding of administrative law hearings was not a "core function" of Petitioner's
job description at all, but a distinctly peripheral one. To turn it into Petitioner's sole
function (particularly when physical and psychological limitations prevented Petitioner
from performing that function - see below) goes far beyond what the rule intended, and
constitutes a violation thereof.
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C.

CSRB Should Have Heard Petitioner's Claim That DWS
Representatives Engaged in Unlawful Harassment Of, and
Retaliation Against, Petitioner in Connection With the Request
for Accommodation of Disabilities, in Violation of Utah
Administrative Code R. 477-15-2 and 3

Citing Utah Administrative Code R. 137-1-5, CSRB dismissed out of hand
Petitioner's claim that DWS's conduct toward him, with respect to his disability claims,
fell within CSRB jurisdiction, concluding that all such claims "are not admissible
under . . . grievance procedures." In this regard, CSRB disregarded three fundamental
facts.
First, Utah Administrative Code R. 477-15-2 and 3 specifically prohibit
discriminatory treatment based upon race, religion, national origin, color, sex, age,
protected activity or disability. This, no less than any other rule incumbent upon DWS,
constitutes a "personnel rule." The Utah Legislature has conferred upon CSRB
jurisdiction "to review appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions
about promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary,
violations of personnel rules

" Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(a) (emphasis

added). CSRB's rule-making authority (on which CSRB expressly relied in enacting
R. 137-1-5 -see R. 137-1-1) is found in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-203. Nowhere in that
Section is CSRB authorized to enact rules limiting its jurisdiction. In other words, the
Legislature conferred upon CSRB jurisdiction to hear grievances, by career service
employees, of personnel rule violations, but did not confer upon CSRB the power to
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invoke its rule-making authority in limiting that jurisdiction. As such, CSRB may not
decline jurisdiction of Petitioner's claims under R. 477-15-2.
Second, R. 137-1-5(1) is limited to "claims alleged to be based upon a legally
prohibited practice as set forth in Section 34A-5-106." By its express terms, the rule has
no application to claims based upon R. 477-15-2 and 3. The fact that that provision
incorporates standards from both the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act does not automatically move it beyond CSRB's jurisdiction. Because
discrimination standards have been incorporated as a personnel rule incumbent upon
DWS, and because DWS has violated that rule in its treatment of Petitioner, CSRB is
clothed with jurisdiction to hear the claim.
Third, Petitioner has attempted to seek redress against DWS for unlawful
discrimination by challenge before proper administrative bodies. His efforts were met by
the Court's Memorandum Decision of August 8,2006 in the 2004 action (R. 628-632).
Therein, the Third District Court came to the startling conclusion that public employees
have no rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act:
During oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff raised the interesting issue of
whether the defendants' argument concerning immunity would effectively
create a "Catch 22" for state employees seeking redress under the ADA.
Defense counsel sought to rebut this conclusion as inaccurate and pointed to
administrative procedures and remedies which are available to employees
claiming discrimination. Because these procedures may not provide the full
scope of redress available under the ADA, there remains a valid concern
that under the state's theory ofsovereign immunityfrom ADA claims, the
ADA is rendered meaningless for an entire class of employees. While this

791475vl

35

Court is mindful of these concerns, its role is construe the law and properly
apply it
Memorandum Decision of August 8,2006 in the 2004 action (R. 628-632) at p. 2
(emphasis added). The Third District Court, then, concluded that Petitioner's claims of
unlawful discrimination could not be brought against the State of Utah through the same
channels available to private employees, the State enjoying sovereign immunity from
those claims. CSRB now asserts that, even though anti-discrimination provisions have
been included in personnel rules incumbent upon DWS, CSRB has no jurisdiction to hear
grievances based thereon. In short, the State of Utah has put Petitioner through a halfdecade shell game, seeking vindication of DWS' discrimination against him, only to be
told at every turn that, meritorious or not, his claims may not be redressed. At some
point, before some forum, DWS needs to be held accountable for its conduct.
D.

CSRB Should Have Exercised Jurisdiction Over Petitioner's
Claim That DWS Representatives Violated Utah Administrative
Code R. 477-2-5 by Failing to Maintain Proper Personnel
Records Concerning Petitioner's Performance, and by Refusing
Access to Alleged Documentation Supposedly Reflecting
Negatively on His Job Performance, and Claimed to Be in His
Personnel File

Utah Administrative Code R. 477-2-5 governs the maintenance of personnel
records by DHRM. The file is to be computerized, and must contain, among other things,
all performance records, "any documents affecting the employee's conduct, status or
salary" (Utah Administrative Code R. 477-2-5(1 )(e)). Under subsection 3 of the rule,
employees have the right to review their personnel file upon request, and challenge any
791475v!
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information contained therein through specified process. Under subsection 4, when a
disciplinary action is rescinded or disapproved upon appeal, any forms, documents and
records pertaining thereto must be removed from the file.
Supposedly, Petitioner successfully challenged his unsuccessful performance
rating in 2003. Yet his examination of the computerized personnel file showed that it had
not been removed. Reportedly, Petitioner's personnel file was littered with affidavits,
statements, memoranda, etc. making his out to be lazy and unproductive, and amply
justifying adverse job actions taken against him - yet upon Grievanf s examination of his
file, none of this documentation was present.
Petitioner was entitled, at the very least, to an order of compliance by DWS with
the mandates of R. 477-2-5, and to an airing of DWS' violation thereof.
E.

DWS Abused Its Discretion in Denying Petitioner Administrative
Leave, in Violation of Utah Administrative Code R. 477-7-7

Utah Administrative Code R. 477-7-7(1 )(a)(iv) provides for the granting of
administrative leave for reasons "consistent with agency policy." There could be no more
emphatic statement of agency policy than that contained at Utah Administrative Code
R. 477-15-1, et seq.y concerning prohibited acts of harassment against individuals due to
disability, or retaliation against them for engaging in protected activity. Petitioner's basis
for seeking administrative leave was DWS's flagrant violation of these provisions, as
addressed above - yet Ms. Ireland waived them aside, saying that Petitioner must exhaust
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sick leave. Whether that decision was right or wrong, a grievance taken therefrom is
clearly within CSRB jurisdiction.
CSRB waives all of this aside by observing that there is no "specific and
designated basis for mandatory approval of administrative leave in the applicable DHRM
rules". (R. 688) In R. 477-7-7(1 )(b)(iii) suggests (if it does not mandate) administrative
leave for "removal from adverse or hostile work environment situations". As is manifest
throughout the record, circumstances arising from the petitioner's work environment were
creating an intolerable situation for Petitioner. See, most notably, Letter of July 31,2003
from Dr. Dennis R. Peterson, M.D. (R. 122).2 CSRB's suggestion that this issue rests
upon nothing but "bare bones allegations" (R. 688) is simply untrue. Certainly, Petitioner
should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing on the point.3
F.

Petitioner Was Entitled to a Hearing Concerning Removal of "Written
Reprimands" From His Personnel File

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l) confers jurisdiction upon CSRB to hear
grievances from "written reprimands". The term "written reprimand" is not a defined
"It is important that Lorin minimize stressful circumstances which increase
adrenalin-induced cardiac output and create a potential catastrophe. In light of recent
precipitation of chest pin by stresses related to his grievance/appeal, I strongly
recommend that Lorin be placed on administrative leave until the grievance and related
issues are satisfactorily resolved." (R. 122)
Petitioner acknowledges that DWS enjoyed a measure of discretion on this issue.
No administrative agency of the State of Utah, however, should enjoy absolute and
unfettered discretion, and CSRB's mandate includes a review of whether agencies abuse
their discretion - Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App.
1993); Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App.1991).
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term under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l). Utah Administrative Code
R. 477-1 l-l(3)(a), however, refers to a "written reprimand" as a means of discipline to be
imposed on a career service employee after the employee has been notified of reasons for
proposed discipline, given an opportunity to respond, and furnished procedural rights
(none of which happened in Petitioner's case - see above).
The Court is referred to letters of July 25, 2003 (R. 135), September 5,2003
(R. 138-139), and October 14,2003 (R. 143-145). They can hardly be viewed as other
than "written reprimands" under the above-referenced regulatory standard. These remain
in Petitioner's personnel file and his right to challenge their correctness, and seek their
removal, is clearly within CSRB's jurisdiction.
CSRB, however, dismisses all of the foregoing by claiming that it is "moot"- that
Petitioner was dismissed for "job abandonment", rather than for performance reasons.
First, nothing in the law cited by DWS or CSRB limits Petitioner's right to
challenge written reprimands by reason of termination of his employment on unrelated
grounds. At the time the challenge was made, Petitioner was a "career service
employee", and his challenge was within CSRB's jurisdiction.
Second, CSRB's observation completely misses the entire point of this case: Tani
Downing, Petitioner's superior, has openly admitted that his "reassignment" to conduct
unemployment hearings full time were driven by performance concerns-concerns which
have yet to be tested in any evidentiary hearing before any tribunal, administrative or
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judicial. See, e.g., September 9,2003 "Change of Assignment" (R. 140). It was
Petitioner's inability to function as a full-time Administrative Law Judge, for physical and
psychological reasons, well known to DWS, that he was unable to return to work after a
year of long-term disability leave, and was therefore terminated for "job abandonment'\
CSRB's suggestion that that termination moots the reprimands which resulted in the very
reassignment which compelled his separation from DWS creates yet another "Catch-22"
scenario for Petitioner to deal with in this matter.
CONCLUSION
Since September of 2003, Petitioner Lorin Blauer has been attempting to get a
simple hearing to challenge the charges leveled at him by Tani Downing, his supervisor,
incident to his "reassignment" to a job which he could not physically or psychologically
perform, resulting in his termination. The simple proposition, though, has vanished into a
labyrinth of procedural maneuvering, checks and tripwires imposed by DWS (and now
CSRB) designed to shield DWS from ever having to answer for its conduct toward
Petitioner.
It is time for this to end. Petitioner should be entitled to his day in court before the
Third District Court, preferably in the context of final resolution of the 2004 action
(including retrial of the remanded claims which are the subject of this proceeding), and
this matter brought to a conclusion.
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Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that CSRB's December 6,2006 order of
dismissal be reversed, and the matter be remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of June, 2007.

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC

By.
Vincent C. Rampton
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 6th day of June, 2007:
J. Clifford Petersen
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
Kevin C. Timpkin
Acting Chairman
Career Service Review Board
State Office Building, Room 1120
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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ADDENDUM

Tabl

BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

LORIN BLAUER,
Grievant,

:
:

v.

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES,

:
:

Agency.

:

DECISION ON
AGENCY'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case No. 28 CSRB/H.0.408

Pursuant to a telephonic Status/Scheduling Conference held on Friday, October 13, 2006,
conducted by the Hearing Officer assigned to adjudicate this issue, oral argument on the Utah
Department of Workforce Services' Motion to Dismiss was held on October 24,2006, at the State
Office Building. Present during the hearing were the Grievant, Lorin Blauer and his administrative
law representative, Tom Cantrell. ! Assistant Utah Attorney General Philip S. Lott appeared on behalf
of the Agency. Also in attendance were JoAnne Campbell, HR Director of the Utah Department of
Human Resources, as the Agency's management representative, and Brian Blake, a paralegal in the
Utah Office of the Attorney General. A certified court reporter made a record of the proceedings. No
witnesses appeared and no other evidence was received into the record other than that which is
already on file.
The sole purpose of this proceeding was to more folly consider the Agency s Motion to
Dismiss filed on September 29,2006, and the Grievant's Response filed October 10,2006, both of
which subsequently followed a Third District Court Memorandum Decision dated August 16,2004.
(Ex. T) As noted by Judge Leslie Lewis in an August 2, 2006 Memorandum Decision, this case
presents a "convoluted procedural history." (Ex. Y) While it is unnecessary to reiterate the entire
history preceding the issues at hand, some limited recitation is necessary to provide a meaningful
context for this decision. All exhibits referred to herein, unless otherwise noted, are appended to the
Agency's Motion to Dismiss.

Attorney Vincent C. Rampton, who has represented the Grievant in various permutations of
this ongoing case, did not attend although notice was duly provided to him.
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BACKGROUND
Grievant began working for the Agency as legal counsel in approximately 1980. Over the
past three and one-half years, Grievant has filed three grievances with the Career Service Review
Board (CSRB), two State court lawsuits, one federal court lawsuit (which he voluntarily withdrew),
and two different appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals in connection with his job at the Agency.
THE FIRST GRIEVANCE - PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS (STEP 4)

In June of 2003, Grievant received a poor performance evaluation from his supervisor
Tani Downing (Ms. Downing). Hefileda grievance to change the evaluation to "successful" and this
grievance was initially denied by Ms. Downing. Part ofthis grievance included Grievanfs claims that
he either did not have a Performance Plan in place or that the one in existence was outdated. He also
complained that he was being held to unfair performance standards. This latter claim may have been
connected with Grievanfs ongoing preparation of a request for ADA accommodations but it is
unclear.2 He subsequently appealed Ms. Downing's initial denial of his grievance to the Agency's
Executive Director Raylene Ireland (Exec. Dir. Ireland). (Ex. G) Sometime thereafter,
Exec. Dir. Ireland agreed with Grievant's request to upgrade his evaluation and the poor evaluation
was changed to "successful."?, the grievance was resolved in Grievant's favor. (Ex. J) Grievant was
also given a new Performance Plan at that time. Finally, he was advised to follow through on any
ADA accommodation request with the proper department.3
THE SECOND GRIEVANCE - DEMOTION (STEP 4)

In September 2003, after his first grievance had been resolved to his satisfaction, Grievant
filed a second grievance, claiming that he had been demoted when he had been recently reassigned
to conduct unemployment hearings full-time. First Ms. Downing and then Exec. Dir. Ireland denied
this grievance after determining that Grievant had not been demoted.
STEP 5 APPEAL OF THE SECOND GRIEVANCE (DEMOTION)

In October 2003, Grievant appealed his denied grievance, the alleged demotion, to the CSRB.
Grievant also appended to this appeal, new claims of "constructive suspension and dismissal,"

2

It is unclear, in part, because Grievant expressly wrote at the time, "my concern is not about
reasonable accommodations as I can - and have been - performing the essential functions of my
position at a highly successful level.11 (Ex. G).
3

Grievant did so and the request was denied (Ex. K).

Blatter v. Workforce Services, Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408
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characterizing the Agency's actions as "discriminatory and retaliatory." No Step 5 formal
adjudicative hearing was held. Instead, in November 2003, the CSRB Administrator, under
applicable rules, issued an Administrative Review of the File Jurisdictional Decision (Jurisdictional
Decision). The Administrator concluded that Grievant's job reassignment did not constitute a
demotion as that term is defined under applicable rules and regulations. The Administrator
determined that Grievant's reassignment of duties was an "internal personnel action" over which the
CSRB had no jurisdiction. The Administrator addressed the newly appended claims of "constructive
suspension and dismissal" in the same decision by noting that because these claims were not "ripe"
(i.e., Grievant had not been terminated, suspended, or left employment), the CSRB had no
jurisdiction.
SEPARATE REQUEST TO AGENCY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE

On or about the same time Grievantfiledhis Second Grievance in September 2003, he also
asked the Agency for "administrative leave based on medical considerations." Exec. Dir. Ireland
informed him that although he was not entitled to take administrative leave on the requested medical
basis, he could apply for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
PURPORTED STEP 5 APPEAL OF DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE

In October 2003, Grievant filed an "appeal" to the CSRB of the Agency's denial ofhis request
for administrative leave. A day or two later, he filed an amended version of this "appeal" to the
CSRB.
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CSRB'S
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THE FILE DECISION

In December of 2003, Grievant filed a request for reconsideration of the jurisdictional
decision addressing his demotion claims. Grievant asked the CSRB Administrator to reconsider his
decision that Grievant's job reassignment did not constitute a demotion, and therefore, the CSRB
had no jurisdiction. He also reiterated his claim - raised in the separate purported "appeal" to the
CSRB in October 2003 - that he was improperly denied administrative leave. Then, he included the
addressed claims of "constructive discharge/dismissal4 and discrimination and retaliation" raised in

4

While Grievant in his motion for reconsideration characterized his claim as constructive
discharge/dismissal, it is clear from a review of the file that he intended to include the claim of
constructive suspension.
Blauer v. Workforce Services, Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408
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the CSRB demotion appeal. Finally, he asserted four other brand new claims which he had not
previously raised: the Agency's failure to define his job performance parameters, the Agency's
violation of personnel rules, the Agency's failure to maintain proper personnel records/refusal to
access personnel records and critical letter constituting "written reprimands.1'
MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter came to the CSRB pursuant to Judge Leslie Lewis' (Judge Lewis) Memorandum
Decision dated August 16,2004. (Ex. T) While the court concluded that Grievant was not demoted
as a matter of law, it left open the issue of the various alleged personnel rules violations related to
the Utah Personnel Management Act such as harassment/retaliation and an improper denial of a
request for administrative leave. Judge Lewis determined: (1) these allegations were raised and
preserved by Grievant in his previous Request for Reconsideration before the CSRB; and (2) they
were not addressed by the CSRB.5 The exact language in Judge Lewis' Memorandum Decision is
as follows:
[I]t appears that the only remaining issue is the CSRB's refusal to consider the
plaintiffs remaining grievances based upon alleged violations of the personnel rules
(Memorandum Decision, page 3; emphasis added.).... Accordingly, to the extent
that the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment seeks a renewed opportunity to
have the CSRB consider his grievance related to the alleged violations of the
Personnel Management Act, the Court grants the same and remands the matter back
to the CSRB. (Memorandum Decision, page 4; emphasis added.)
The only claims as determined by the district court pursuant to Grievant's Request for
Reconsideration of Administrative Review and Final Agency Action with which the CSRB is
charged to consider are:
(1)

the Agency violated Utah Admin. Code R477-10-1, et seq. by failing to define
[Grievant's] job performance parameters;

(2)

the Agency violated personnel rales by assigning job tasks to Grievant falling
outside his job description, in violation of Utah Admin. Code R477-3-2 and 3;

5

The Administrator did not address the "extraneous" personnel violation claims in his
Decision on Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration for the following reason: "Because I do not find
that a demotion in fact occurred, I have limited my discussion... I recognize that Grievant's Request
for Reconsideration addressed other issues primarily, but not entirely, stemming from the argument
that a demotion had occurred. Based upon my decision herein however, it is unnecessary to address
these arguments
" (Decision on Grievant's Request for Reconsideration at 3)
Blauer v. Workforce Services* Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408
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(3)

Agency representatives engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against
Grievant in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities, in
violation of Utah Admin. Code R477-15-2 and 3;

(4)

Agency representatives violated Utah Admin. Code R477-2-5 by failing to maintain
proper personnel records concerning Grievant's performance, and by refusing access
to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting negatively on his job performance,
and claimed to be in his personnel file;

(5)

the Agency violated Utah Admin. Code R477-7-7 by denying Grievant administrative
leave; and

(6)

critical letters from Ms.Tani Downing and Ms. Raylene Ireland remaining in
Grievant's personnel file constituted written reprimands, grievable to the CSRB
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l).

At the outset of this proceeding, Grievant moved to continue oral argument based primarily
in the "interests of judicial economy." When questioned, Grievant explained that a motion to
consolidate various proceedings had been filed with the Third Judicial District Court but no decision
had yet been issued. Mr. Cantrell opined that the motion to consolidate likely would be granted, and
that oral argument on Grievant's personnel violation claims should be heard after that time. Although
Grievant did not know when the motion to consolidate had been filed, Mr. Lott opined that it had
been "a few months ago" and objected to Grievant's request for a continuance. The Agency's attorney
argued that Grievant's motion to consolidate was a "separate issue before the judge relating to § 1983
ADA/Utah anti-discrimination claims" and disagreed that the motion would be granted "because the
CSRB lackes jurisdiction over such claims." Because this case has been winding its way though
various forums for approximately three and one-half years, and because Grievant's argument
grounded in the "interests ofjudicial economy" was speculative, his motion was denied.
Grievant's arguments essentially are twofold. First, Judge Lewis' remand order of August 16,
2004, stating that specified matters relating to alleged violations of personnel rules should be
considered by the CSRB, means that, according to the "law of the case," the CSRB must conduct a
Jull hearing on the merits of these allegations to determine their validity, regardless ofwhen and how
they were raised in the previous proceedings. Second, Grievant argues that because Judge Lewis
ordered the CSRB to consider certain claims, it follows that the CSRB must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of those claims.

Blauer v. Workforce Services, Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408
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I do not agree with Grievant's interpretation of Judge Lewis' choice of language. One need
not hold a full evidentiary hearing in order to properly assess the merits of Grievant's remaining
claims. Indeed, in some instances, that process would border on the ridiculous or violate existing
rules as discussed below. Had Judge Lewis' determined that it was mandatory to hold a full-blown
Step 5 hearing (a formal adjudicative proceeding) to consider Grievant's remaining claims, she easily
could have deliniated that process. The word "consider" is not identical to the word "hearing." The
term "consider" means to "think about carefully" to "study" or "contemplate" or "give thought in
order to reach a suitable conclusion." (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988)) As I read
the court's instructions, what must occur in this matter is that the CSRB address, in some fashion,
Grievant's remaining claims.
JURISDICTION
I agree with the Agency's arguments that the CSRB is without jurisdiction to hear these issues
in a formal adjudicative proceeding. An analogous situation would be where a trial court had granted
summary judgment in favor of one party, an appeal was filed and a decision rendered, but then, the
losing party goes back to the trial court to file a motion to reconsider the summary judgment
decision, and includes claims not previously presented. Moreover, merely recasting former claims
- which were already adjudicated - in new window dressing such as "personnel rule violations" does
not give them new life.
Like the Agency, I also believe that lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time. (Bradbury
v. Valencia, 5 P.3d 649,650-1 (Utah 2000)) Grievant raised his claims relating to job performance
parameters (issue #1 above) in his First Grievance and naturally, did not appeal the Step 4 decision
in his favor. The CSRB lacks jurisdiction to hear a grievance that was previously resolved in the
Grievant's favor. In essence, this claim does not exist anymore.
Grievant raised his claims relating to assigned tasks outside his job description (issue # 2
above) in his Second Grievance. The CSRB addressed this claim inherently as part of the same
demotion grievance when it concluded that the tasks Grievant had been given were properly within
his job. The Utah Court of Appeals in Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204,
1211 (Utah App. 2005), ultimately determined that the assigned tasks were properly within
Grievant's job description. The Utah Court of Apeals in Blauer succintly held "[the] CSRB did not
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err in declining jurisdiction over Blauer's grievance." (Id. at 1204) The CSRB is without jurisdiction
to hear this claim based on res judicata (issue preclusion).
Grievant failed to raise his claims of unlawful harassment and retaliation with or without any
connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities at any time prior to his Request for
Reconsideration (issue #3 above). The CSRB simply has no jurisdiction over these claims pursuant
to Utah Admin. CodeRl37-l-5. Such claims by law must befiledwith the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division. (Id. (See also Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842,852 (Utah 2004).) Moreover, these issues
simply cannot be raised for the first time at the Step 5 level.
Grievant also failed to raise his claims (issue #4 above) that the Agency failed to [properly]
maintain his personnel record and refused him access [to certain documentation] prior tofilinghis
Request for Reconsideration. It is impossible under existing CSRB rules to "reconsider" an issue of
this type that was never raised at the Department level. Moreover, Grievant was, in fact, granted
access to his personnel files. The only "problem" is that the documents he "supposed" were there,
were not. The CSRB is not obligated to hear claims based on mere supposition after an employee
has been terminated for unrelated reasons.
Grievant's additional claim is that he was improperly denied administrative leave (issue #5
above). He failed to file a Step 4 grievance in connection with this claim and only in his amended
purported Step 5 appeal did this claim first appear. As stated above, it is impossible under existing
CSRB rules to "reconsider" an issue of this type that was never raised at the Department level. Thus,
the CSRB is without jurisdiction to hear this matter.
Finally, Grievant's remaining claim (issue #6 above) had no antecedent grievance and
appeared for the first time in his Request for Reconsideration. Grievant asserts that certain of his
supervisors' documentation and correspondence constituted "written reprimands." Again, it is
impossible under existing CSRB rules to "reconsider" an issue of this type that was never raised at
the Agency level. The CSRB has no jurisdiction to go back and somehow hear claims not raised with
the proper entity more than three and one-half years ago - the time they were required to be filed
To the extent the court may require a more detailed analysis, this decision will provide the
same below.
ANALYSIS
Issue #1: The Agency violated Utah Admin. Code R477-10-1, et seq.. by failing to define
[Grievant's] job performance parameters.
Blauer v. Workforce Services. Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408
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DHRM R477-10-1 (a) states: "Performance standards and expectations for each employee
shall be specifically written in a performance plan by August 30 of eachfiscalyear." As noted under
"Background" above, the Agency fulfilled any duty it had under R477-10-1 to define Grievant's "job
performance parameters/standards" by issuing a new Performance Plan dated July 18,2003 (Ex. H)
pursuant to the First Grievance. Grievant acknowledges this undisputed fact in his Response to
Motion to Dismiss wherein he states, beginning on page 10, "It is true that the Grievant's allegation
of failure to define job performance standards and failure to have a current performance plan were
raised in what the Agency defines as 'the first grievance' and that a Step 4 decision was issued in
Grievant's favor." He continues, "It is true that Grievant prevailed on hisfirstgrievance and did not
appeal beyond the Step 4 Decision because there was no apparent reason to." (Grievant's Response
at 11 ,)6 There still is no legitimate basis to revisit this issue and I conclude that the evidence in the
record reflects that the Agency did not violate R477-10-1.
Issue #2: The Agency violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to Grievant falling outside his
job description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-3-2 and 3.
DHRM R477-3-2 governs employee job descriptions. Job descriptions are to contain a "job
title; distinguishing characteristics; a description of tasks commonly associated with most positions
in the job' a statement of required knowledge, skills and other requirements; FLSA status* and other
administrative information." R477-3-3 (Assignment of Duties) states that, "Management may assign,
modify or remove any employee task or responsibility in order to accomplish reorganization,
improve business practices or process, or for any other reason deemed appropriate by the department
administration." Although R477-3-2 and 3 were not specifically cited at the time, this issue
constitutes the subject matter of Grievant's Second Grievance, i.e., he was reassigned to conduct
unemployment hearings full-time. The CSRB Administrator analyzed this issue, albeit in the form
of a claim that Grievant was demoted, in his Jurisdictional Decision. He determined that Grievant's

6

Despite his overt recognition that the Agency did issue job performance standards in
accordance with Utah Admin. Code R477-10-1, Grievant presents the argument that further
consideration of this issue is somehow required because "[TJo t he extent that the Step 4 Decision
later contributed to Grievant's injury, though, the CSRB does have jurisdiction to further consider
these allegations in the context of the current grievance, because the District Court and the Court of
Appeals have so determined." (Grievant's Response at 11)
Blauer v. Workforce Services, Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408
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job reassignment was valid and permissible under applicable rules and regulations in that Grievant's
job had always included conducting unemployment hearings. Moreover, R477-3-3 expressly allows
modifications to an employee's job duties. This is exactly what occurred in Grievant's case.
After the CSRB Administrator had rendered his Jurisdictional Decision, upon Grievant's
appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals in Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204
(Utah App. 2005) further considered this issue. Again, although R477-3-2 and 3 were not specifically
cited, the Court concluded however, that the adjudication of unemployment claims were properly
within Grievant's core duties that he had previously performed part-time but was now required to
perform full-time. The Court observed, "Because of Blauer's previous, and not uncommon,
assignments to adjudications, DWS claims that in reapportioning Blauer's job responsibilities from
part-time to full-time adjudicator, DWS did nothing more than extend one of Blauer's core job
functions, in response to varying department needs. We agree and conclude that DWS's assignments
of Blauer to full-time adjudications, a job function DWS had delegated to Blauer, and other Legal
Enforcement Counsel HI, in the past, "did not constitute a demotion

" Blauer v. DWS at 1210.

And, "Here, as discussed above, there was no change in job or position, but rather a reallocation by
DWS of Blauer's then existing job responsibilities." (Id. at 1210) Moreover, a review of Grievant's
Performance Plan/Evaluations for the periods July 1,1999 to June 30,2000 (Ex. D), July 1,2000
to June 30, 2001 (Ex. E) and July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, reflects that unemployment hearings
were a part of Grievant's workload and did not fall outside the DWS Legal Counsel/Administrative
Law Judge Performance Plan. (Id.)
To this day, Grievant has never mentioned any other "job task" to which he was assigned and
which he found objectionable or allegedly violated personnel rules other than conducting
unemployment hearings. Even then, it was the increased number of unemployment hearings that he
found objectionable.7 Because Grievant has not designated any other "job task" which presumably
violated personnel rules other than conducting unemployment hearings, and because that very issue

7

Based on the record submitted to it, the Court of Appeals found that presiding over
unemployment hearings in a four-year periodfrom1999-2003 was a job function DWS consistently
assigned to Blauer." (Id. at 1210) For instance, in 2000, DWS assigned Blauer to six to twenty
hearings a week for 36 weeks and prior to 2003, DWS assigned Blauer to an average of eight
hearings a week over the course of nineteen weeks." (Id.)
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has been decided by both the CSRB and the Utah Court of Appeals, this claim has been repeatedly
and conclusively determined.
Issue #3: Agency representatives engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against Grievant
in connection with his request for accommodation ofdisabilities, in violation ofUtah Administrative
CodeR477-15-2and3.
DHRM R477-15-2 governs unlawful harassment. By definition under subsection (1),
unlawful harassment means, "discriminatory treatment based on race, religion, national origin, color,
sex, age, protected activity or disability." Harassment can result in a hostile, offensive or intimating
work environment under this policy under subsection (2Xa). Such behavior can also result in a
tangible employment action being taken against the harassed employee under subsection (2)(b).
R477-15-3 prohibits retaliation against an employee, "who has opposed a practice forbidden under
[this] policy, or has filed a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing under [this] policy or is otherwise engaged in protected
activity." Grievant never raised a harassment claim until he filed his Request for Reconsideration
with the CSRB.
R477-15 (Unlawful Harassment Policy and Procedure) sets forth the proper complaint and
investigative procedure for employees who believe they have been aggrieved. Grievant failed to avail
himself of these proper avenues with his employer at the time he was required to do so. Only now,
after Grievant has been terminated for job abandonment and has lost his demotion claim, does he
pursue these issues with the CSRB. The CSRB, however, is expressly prohibitedfromhearing these
claims regardless of when they vrere raised or whether they are raised in conjunction with a disability
accommodations' request. {See Utah Admin. Code R137-1-5: "Claims alleged to be based upon a
legally prohibited practice ... including employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
pregnancy, childbirth... age... religion, national origin, or disability, are not admissible under these
grievance procedures. The CSRB and the CSRB hearing officers have no jurisdiction over the
preceding claims.")
Issue #4: Agency representatives violated Utah Administrative Code R477-2-5 by failing to maintain
proper personnel records concerning Grievant's performance, and by refusing access to alleged
documentation supposedly reflecting negatively on his job performance, and claimed to be in his
personnel file.
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R477-2-5 governs personnel records. The provision mandates what types of records must be
maintained, as appropriate, and how they should be maintained. Subsection (e) specifically permits
"copies of any documents affecting the employee's conduct, status or salary. . . ." R477-2-5 also
provides a mechanism for employees who feel aggrieved by how their personnel files are being
maintained - subsection (4). Grievant, however, never pursued these procedures during the time he
worked for the Agency when he was required to do so. Grievant never raised these claims until he
filed his Request for Reconsideration with the CSRB.
Moreover, these claims are moot. Grievant was not terminated based on any performance
assessments or criteria contained in the Agency's records. He was terminated because he abandoned
his job. Grievant was not "demoted" based on performance assessments or criteria contained in the
Agency's records. In fact, he was not demoted at all, but merely reassigned to perform duties that
were already in his job description. Grievant was not disciplined in any fashion based on
performance assessments contained in the Agency records. Indeed, he was never disciplined. The
record in this matter reveals that Grievant was allowed access to his personnel file. There were no
documents "supposedly reflecting negatively on his job performance" which were relied upon, used
or required by the Agency in any actions that it undertook.
Issue #5: The Agency violated Utah Admin. Code R477-7-7 by denying Grievant administrative
leave.
Absent a specific and designated basis for mandatory approval of administrative leave in the
applicable DHRM rules, the granting of administrative leave under R477-7-7 is discretionary and
then, only if it is consistent with Agency policy ("Administrative leave may be granted consistent
with agency policy.") There is nothing in the record that indicates why Grievant believes that the
Agency allegedly violated R477-7-7 when it denied his request for "administrative leave related to
medical reasons." Instead, Grievant appears to believe that because he characterized his request as
necessary for "medical reasons," that the Agency was obligated to give it to him.8

8

Grievant's written submission on this issue is less than enlightening: "It is true that Grievant
was informed by Director Ireland that his request for administrative leave based on medical
considerations was denied. The Agency's argument that the rule upon which Grievant relies, R477-7-7,
is discretionary and is dependent upon 'agency policy1 can be heard by the CSRB because the Courts
have so ruled." (Grievant's Response to Motion to Dismiss at 13.) Actually, Grievant misquotes this
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There is, however, evidence in the record that the Agency researched Grievant's request and
could find no provision that mandated approval ofGrievant's request. (Ex. Q) The Agency's response
to Grievant indicated that while annual leave, sick leave or FMLA could be used to support an
extended absence, Grievant's situation did not require the Agency to grant his request. Bare bone's
allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim that the Agency violated R477-7-7, particularly in light
of the fact that whether to grant or deny Grievant administrative leave was within the Agency's
discretion.
Issue #6: Critical lettersfromMs.Tani Downing and Ms. Raylene Ireland remaining in Grievant's
personnel file constituted written reprimands, grievable to the CSRB pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. S 67-19a-302( 1)
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l) states that certain State employees may grieve written
reprimands. The "critical letters"9 to which Grievant alludes allegedly constituting written
reprimands are simply a moot issue in this case regardless of whether they were "grievable" under
§67-19a-302(l). Grievant was terminated on a basis other than his performance, i.e., job
abandonment, where any written reprimand, if issued, played no role. In addition, the issue of
whether Grievant was demoted (where written reprimands conceivably may have been relevant) has
already been conclusively determined by the Utah Court of Appeals. Thus, whether or not these
various letters could be considered "written reprimands" - and could have been grieved on that basis
— is irrelevant.

provision. The granting of leave under this rule is not dependent on policy but rather, must only be
consistent with policy. At any rate, it still remains discretionary. The CSRB simply does not have
jurisdiction over discretionary matters. As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Lopez v. Career
Service Review Board:
"[Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute mandates.
Absent the statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain benefit, the
employee may not demand it as a right... Lopez has failed to identify any personnel
rule that was violated by the Commission's refusal to allow him to job share.
Jurisdiction therefore was properly denied."
{Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct App.) (1992))
9

The letters to which Grievant refers are attached to the Agency's Motion to Dismiss as Ex. I,
Ex. J and other communicationsfromthe Agency are all contained in the record.
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Moreover, a review in the record of the communications between the Agency and Grievant
reflects that they were not designated as "written reprimands" as required by DHRM rules and thus,
they could not be used or construed as such in any Agency action. No rule or policy violations were
noted in these letters and no adverse action thereafter was based on their content. In feet,
Exec. Dir. Ireland's letter (Ex. J) indicates that she reversed Grievant's Performance Evaluation from
"unsuccessful" to "successful." The letter from Tani Downing (Ex. I) merely outlines her reasons
underlying her "unsuccessful" performance evaluation in responding to Grievant's objection, an
evaluation that was later changed to "successful."
DECISION
Based on the foregoing, the Agency's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

It is so ORDERED this 6th day of December 2006.

TT^

Katherine A. Fox
CSRB Hearing/Presiding Officer
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals of this final agency action and decision may be obtained
pursuant to Utah Code §§63~46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. To obtain judicial review, a
party must file a petition for judicial review with the Court within 30 days of the date that this order or decision
is issued (i.e., signature date).
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LORIN BLAUER,
Plaintiff,

PROPOSED ORDER IN
CONFORMANCE WITH THE
MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED
AUGUST 16,2003

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES,

Civil No. 040900221
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated August 16,2004,
the Court hereby orders and adjudges:
1.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. The Court has Jurisdiction to

consider the matter.
2.

There is no genuine issue of material fact, and as a matter of law, the Defendant

did not demote the Plaintiff when it assigned him to perform the duties of an administrative law
judge. The CSRB was correct in reaching this same conclusion.. Accordingly, the PlaintifFs

000582

First Claim for Relief is dismissed with prejudice, with the exception that the allegations in
Paragraph 34 subsections ©) through (j) of the complaint which do are not based upon unlawful
demotion, and which were also set forth by the Plaintiff in his Motion for Reconsideration
(previously filed with the CSRB), are remanded to the CSRB for consideration. Those
allegations are: A) DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R477-10-1, et seq by failing to
define job performance parameters; B)DWS violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to
Grievant falling outside of his job description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-32 and 3; C) DWS representatives engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against
Grievant in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities, in violation of Utah
Administrative Code R477-15-2 and 3; D) DWS representatives violated Utah Administrative
Code R477-2-5 by failing to maintain proper personnel records concerning Grievant's
performance, and by refusing access to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting negatively
on his job performance, and claimed to be in his personnel file; E). DWS violated Utah
Administrative Code R477-7-7 by denying Grievant administrative leave; and F) Critical letters
from Ms. Downing and Ms. Ireland, remaining in Grievant's personnel file constitute 'Svritten
reprimands, grievable to CSRB pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 67-19a-302(l).
3.

The Plaintiffs Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief are based upon an

alleged unlawful demotion and are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
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DATED this

V

day of November, 2004.
BY

THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS

OF

'V
s&r

"*o DJST^ V
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this c*Q

day of November, 2004,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing PROPOSED ORDER IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE
MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED AUGUST 16,2003 to be mailed by United States
mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Vincent C. Rampton
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
P.O. Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Attorney for Plaintiff
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GABRIELLE LEE CARUSO (7368)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys forDept. of Workforce Services
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Ph: (801) 366-0100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LORINBLAUER,
Plaintiff,

PROPOSED ORDER IN
CONFORMANCE WITH THE
| MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED
| AUGUST 16,2003

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES,

Civil No. 040900221
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated August 16,2004,
the Court hereby orders and adjudges:
1.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. The Court has Jurisdiction to

consider the matter.
2.

There is no genuine issue of material fact, and as a matter of law, the Defendant

did not demote the Plaintiff when it assigned him to perform the duties of an administrative law
judge. The CSRB was correct in reaching this same conclusion.. Accordingly, the PlaintifTs
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First Claim for Relief is dismissed with prejudice, with the exception that the allegations in
Paragraph 34 subsections ©) through (j) of the complaint which do are not based upon unlawful
demotion, and which were also set forth by the Plaintiff in his Motion for Reconsideration
(previously filed with the CSRB), are remanded to the CSRB for consideration. Those
allegations are: A) DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R477-10-1, et seq by failing to
define job performance parameters; B)DWS violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to
Grievant falling outside of his job description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-32 and 3; C) DWS representatives engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against
Grievant in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities, in violation of Utah
Administrative Code R477-15-2 and 3; D) DWS representatives violated Utah Administrative
Code R477-2-5 by failing to maintain proper personnel records concerning Grievant's
performance, and by refusing access to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting negatively
on his job performance, and claimed to be in his personnel file; E). DWS violated Utah
Administrative Code R477-7-7 by denying Grievant administrative leave; and F) Critical letters
from Ms. Downing and Ms. Ireland, remaining in Grievant's personnel file constitute 'Nvritten
reprimands, grievable to CSRB pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 67-19a-302(l).
3.

The Plaintiffs Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief are based upon an

alleged unlawful demotion and are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
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op day of November, 2004.

DATED this v

BY THE COURT:

YA

THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this c^O

day of November, 2004,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing PROPOSED ORDER IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE
MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED AUGUST 16,2003 to be mailed by United States
mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Vincent C. Rampton
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
P.O. Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORIN BLAUER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

COURT'S RULING

5

CASE NO. 040900221

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES, an agency of the
State of Utah,

:
:

Defendant.

The

Court

:

has before

it a request

for decision

filed by

the

plaintiff seeking a ruling on his Motion to Reconsider Order of Remand
to Career Services Review Board ("CSRB"), and to Consolidate.
At the outset, the Court notes that it has reviewed the moving and
responding memoranda concerning the plaintiff's Motion, as well as the
various supplemental briefs and information which were recently submitted
to

the

Court.

The

Court's

initial

inclination

was

to

deny

the

plaintiff's Motion so that the CSRB could fully assess and decide his
claims of personnel rule violations, in accordance with the Court's prior
ruling.
claims

In fact, as the plaintiff acknowledges, the Court remanded these
to

the

CSRB

in the

first place

because

of

the

plaintiff's

counsel's representations and request for remand during a prior oral
argument.

The fact that the plaintiff has now had a change of heart and

would instead prefer to have this Court consider all of his remaining

BLAUER V. UTAH DEPT.
OF WORKFORCE SVCS.
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claims is not a sufficient basis for the Court to reconsider its prior
ruling.
However, the defendant's recent filing of a Motion to Dismiss before
the CSRB puts an entirely new complexion on the plaintiff's pending
Motion to Reconsider.

Specifically, the defendant's Motion essentially

argues that the CSRB does not have jurisdiction and ought not to consider
the claims previously remanded to it by this Court.

Given this Court's

prior rulings, the purpose of this Motion remains unclear.
The Court will await a decision by the CSRB on the defendant's
Motion

to

Dismiss

before

reaching

a

definitive

decision

on

the

plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. Counsel for either side should contact
the Court's law clerk, Alexandra Doctorman, to inform the Court of the
CSRB's decision on the Motion to Dismiss.

The Court will defer ruling

on the Motion to Reconsider until it hears from counsel.
Dated this__-2Q_day of October, 2006.

LESLIE A. 1LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this_J
2006:

Vincent C. Rampton
Attorney for Plaintiff
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Philip S. Lott
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
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